The Boston Celtics are The Death Star of the NBA

The Boston Celtics have been an absolute juggernaut this season! They’re currently 59-17, a win percentage of 0.776. 

Check any sports publication; every expert has them in the NBA Finals, most even picking them to win it all. Their coronation as NBA champions is seemingly inevitable.

Number one seed in the Eastern Conference; clinched. 

Home-court advantage in the NBA Finals; basically clinched.

Boston has been among the best 82-game teams in recent memory, sporting a +11.4 net rating for the year. The difference between Boston and the second-closest team in net rating (Oklahoma City) is 4.3 points. According to Shane Young (@YoungNBA on Twitter), no team with this large net rating gap in the past 75 years hasn’t won the NBA title!

They’re the Death Star. Massive in size with lasers that can shoot from distance. Boston is currently:

• 1st in Threes made per game - 16.6.

• 1st in Threes attempted per game - 42.6

• 1st in eFG% - 57.8

• 2nd in Three Point % - 38.9

However, like the Death Star, Boston has its version of a Thermal Exhaust Port. 

Any team that wants to exploit it needs the same two-pronged plan of attack that the Rebel Alliance had: Use teamwork to get an elite operator in the perfect place to expose the flaw in the system and start a chain reaction that spreads from the interior. 

It’s a simple plan but not easy to execute. 

However, a few specific teams—Denver, Milwaukee, Minnesota, and Oklahoma City—have the necessary ingredients to make this plan a reality.

Boston has three wins and five losses this season against the teams listed above, with a 0.375 winning percentage. Compared to the other 25 teams in the league, Boston has 55 wins and only 11 losses, a winning percentage of 0.833!!

Kristaps Porzingis, Boston’s Thermal Exhaust Port:

Since Porzingis arrived in Boston, he's been a revelation. He fits in seamlessly on a stacked roster and has supercharged what was already a great offense.

Per CLG, Boston is the league's leader in Points per 100 possessions (123.4). They are a devastating offensive force!

Porzingis has been enjoying the most efficient season of his career in his epicenter action: PnR roll man and its counterpart, the Post-up.

(Numbers according to Synergy)

These actions are two sides of the same coin; they are perfect counters to one another, and Porzingis’s uniqueness is at the heart of what makes defending Boston’s offense one of the most challenging tasks a defense can face. 

Plenty has already been said about Porzingis's post-up efficiency, especially when teams switch the PnR action and stash a smaller defender on him. He’s punishing switches, and it’s an efficient piece of Boston’s regular-season offense.

Porzingis has been effective in posting smaller players.

The post-ups vs. switches are a fun byproduct of his main epicenter action: PnR Roll Man. Porzingis’s efficiency as the PnR screener comes from his ability to “pop” the action and shoot the ball at a high clip from three instead of rolling the action.

Porzingis has been dynamite shooting the ball in the Pick-and-Pop this year, hitting 41 threes at a scorching 45.1%. 

In his 192 actions as the PnR Roll Man, he is shooting an eFG% of 67.6, and over half of his FG attempts in the PnR situation have been from three (91) vs. two (71).

Porzingis’s shooting in the pick-and-pop has supercharged Boston’s offense, creating panic-thinking opportunities for every defender.

His shooting is the lynchpin of Boston’s offense; it’s created spacing, optionality, mismatches, and a chain reaction that makes defending Boston an absolute nightmare!

Awesome offensive firepower always comes at a price. For the Death Star, it was in the form of the thermal exhaust port that was needed to prevent the laser's reactor from overheating. In Boston’s case, the trade-off for incorporating Porzingis’s offensive optionality is finding a creative way to protect him on the defensive end of the court. 

Part I: The Funnel:

Boston’s primary method of sheltering Porzingis on defense is to stash him on the opposing team's weakest offensive player, who is not a primary PnR screener. 

This strategy is designed to let Porzingis spend most of his time as a help defender, not a primary defender. Taking Porzingis out of situations where he is a primary defender covers his most significant defensive deficiency: his foot speed. While also unleashing his shot-blocking skills to thrive! Porzingis is averaging almost two blockers per game, good for 9th in the league.

This strategy also serves as a deterrent to the opposing team's primary offensive weapons by freeing up Porzingis to show early help in almost any driving situation. This removes valuable space to attack and creates a funnel where the ball is forced to the weakest offensive player on the floor.

It’s not a unique strategy, but it’s rather ingenious. The Minnesota Timberwolves have used this same approach with Golbert throughout the year during most of their double-big lineups. I wrote about it back in November; click here if you want to check it out.

Beating this coverage is step one to taking out Boston’s Thermal Exhaust Port. It requires leaning into the player getting the funnel treatment and empowering them to attack. Success vs. the funnel is often a matter of confidence, not skill.

If this player can not beat the funnel, then Porzingis will be allowed to wreak havoc on both ends of the floor, and your chances of beating Boston are slim to none.

Against the elite teams mentioned above (two of which Boston will most likely have to beat to win a Championship), Boston has primarily used the Porzingis funnel on Aaron Gordon, Payton Watson, Jaden McDaniels, Jae Crowder, Brook Lopez, and Josh Giddy.

On January 2nd, Oklahoma City’s Josh Giddy had himself a night while being the target of the Porzingis Funnel. 

The Thunder create 23 open C&S threes per game (per Chris Herring on the Lowe Post Podcast); they are the best drive-and-kick team in the NBA.

By setting up the Porzingis funnel, Boston chose who they wanted to shoot these drive-and-kick threes: Giddy.

When the ball was “funneled” to Giddy using this strategy, he shot and attacked confidently (not always common). Giddy went 4/7 from three-point range and 3/4 from two-point range. He scored 18 points when the ball was funneled to him, committed only one turnover, and, most importantly, only turned down one wide-open three-point shot.

Giddy’s effectiveness during the funnel provided great individual play for his team and forced Boston to remove the funnel. This forced Boston to go to Plan B and risk exposing Porzingis to a matchup where he is a primary defender. 

Part II: The Elite Operator:

Any team that can beat the “Porzingis funnel” gets the opportunity to play Boston straight up, best vs. best, Oklahoma Drill style!

Porzingis is not a complete zero defensively; he’s smart, communicates well, and puts in effort. He’s been in the league long enough to know how unique his current situation is in Boston and will not take it for granted. That matters. You’re going to get his best effort possible every time.

However, some warts can not be covered, no matter how hard you try. This is the case for Porzingis, which is why specific elite operators are perfectly positioned to bring the Boston machine to a screeching halt.

A big who can execute pick-and-pop actions at a high level can mercilessly take advantage of Porzingis’s warts and throw Boston into panic mode. 

(Porzingis warts: Slow foot speed and high hips)

The four elite teams that Boston has struggled with all have guys who fit the mold: Holmgren, Towns, Reid, Lopez, Portis, and Jokic. 

Once the funnel is beaten and Porzingis is forced to guard one of these guys, Boston's PnR defense becomes severely compromised. 

A high-level pick-and-pop big makes Boston cycle through these options:

1. Switch (Least palatable): Porzingis getting put on an island with a guard is not a matchup that Boston consistently wants.

Joe Mazzulla said after the ATL games that Boston is using games to get different looks on film for the Playoffs - switching Porzingis was one of those looks.

2. Drop -> Closeout (Standard operating procedure): Boston’s first option is to cover these actions with only two players, the ball handler’s defender + Porzingis, and hope for a few misses of semi-contested shots.

Asking Porzingis to closeout to a shooter from this far away exposes his defensive warts.

3. Third Defender Stunt/Rotate (We got your back): If the big makes a few shots and starts spamming this action, Boston will get a third defender involved (closest weakside tag player). The third defender will stunt/rotate to Porzingis’s man on the pop and give time for Porzingis to recover or completely stay and start a defensive rotation.

Pritchard, Brown, and Birssett all get involved early in the action as a 3rd defender.

4. Pre-Switch (Let the adults handle it): The best scenario is to get Porzingis out of the action before it starts.

White gets Porzingis out of the action early. This is possible for Boston to do when an offense is not being run with pace.

The numbers below are according to Second Spectrum and represent when Porzingis guarded PnR in the eight games vs. Denver, Milwaukee, Minnesota, and Oklahoma City.

An elite pick-and-pop operator is the most challenging cover for Porzingis. A big who can consistently shoot and attack long closeouts in a pick-and-pop setting can start a devastating chain reaction to the Boston defense and put the machine as a whole in jeopardy of being compromised.

Jokic Interlude:

He’s unique, cut from a cloth different than any other big in the world. He’s a riddle wrapped inside of an enigma that no one has been able to solve. His mixture of skill, size, power, and intelligence is genuinely one of a kind.  He presents multiple problems for Porzingis and Boston.

In addition to being a plus-level Pick-and-Pop threat, he’s also a punishing post player who can score against any single coverage and create wide-open shots for his teammates when doubled.

He’s a problem for every team in the league, but Boston will likely need to get through him to make it to their coronation.

During the first matchup this season, Boston decided to cover him one-on-one in the post. It didn’t go well, no matter who was guarding Jokic. He went 10/12 during the game while single-covered and was an absolute force! 

The buckets that Jokic scored on Porzingis were easy, too easy. Porzingis was paper mache; he provided a resistance level equal to pre-game warm-up stuff for Jokic.

Jokic doing Jokic things in the post vs. Porzingis

This forced Boston to use the double-big Horford + Porzingis lineup, allowing Horford to guard Jokic while directing the Porzingis funnel toward Aaron Gordon. With the funnel on, Gordon went 0-3 from three. He eventually found his way to the dunker spot, where he could be more effective vs. the funnel.

Porzingis & Horford Two-Man Pairing vs. Denver

The Porzingis + Horford two-man pairing is excellent. According to CLG, it’s played 1117 possessions throughout the season and has a +13.0 rating, placing it in the 98th percentile for the entire league. 

However, out of the 27:55 minutes played together, only 5:46 came in the 4th quarter. During that run, the Horford + Porzingis two-man pairing was -2. 

In the 4th quarter stretch, they did play together; only 3:46 of those minutes came when Jokic was in the game; the Horford + Porzingis two-man pairing tired those minutes.

During that run, Jokic scored on two post-ups vs. Horford, and Horford missed a pick-and-pop three.

Jokic and Horford guard one another, which means that Jokic doesn’t have to guard Porzingis during the PnR action. Putting the Boston offense caught in between two minds:

1. We want Porzingis in the PnR action with Tatum as the ball handler. It’s our most dynamic combination.

2. We want Jokic guarding the PnR action with Tatum as the ball handler. At the end of the game, he’s the defender we want to involve in these actions.

The double-big lineup puts the decision on Boston to choose what is most important to them.

Using Porzingis in the PnR actions means that Jokic gets to rest on defense as Horford is spaced in the corner. It also almost guarantees that Denver’s best defenders, KCP and Gordon, will be involved in the point-of-attack defense when it matters most. Porzingis has mashed smaller switches with post-ups all season, yet something in me finds it hard to believe Boston would want to live and die with Porzingis post-ups with the season on the line.

Including Horford in the PnR actions means that Jokic has to guard it. However, it also places Porzingis, Boston’s most dynamic PnR screener, in the corner to space the floor, bringing back shades of the Mavericks series vs. the Clippers in 2021.

All this brings us to an interesting question: 

Can Boston beat Denver in the Finals if their best lineup vs. them can’t be their closing lineup?

The Porzingis + Horford pairing is perfect for eating up the middle innings. It saves Porzingis from getting bashed by Jokic for an entire game, but can it win in the last six minutes of Finals games—Best vs. Best?

I don’t want this to be a Denver vs. Boston preview, so I’ll stop there. But if we get these two teams in the Finals, we should consider ourselves lucky. It’s an entertaining four-dimensional chess match waiting to happen!

The 2024 Playoffs:

As Seth Partnow explains in Midrage Theory, the difference between the 82-game regular season and the 16-win playoffs is about strategy. Game Theory Optimal vs. Fully Exploitative Play.

The best have to be able to do their best against the best.

Boston has built the perfect GTO machine, capable of churning out regular season wins vs. a wide range of opponents. But can they consistently get to their most devastating actions vs. elite teams?

Maybe? Maybe not?

Boston hasn’t shown all its cards yet, which is fun for potential matchups. Here’s an example of a counter Boston could use against these elite teams to try to keep the funnel in place and protect Porzingis:

Hunt individual matchups like Michael Porter Jr.

Boston did not show a willingness to hunt MPJ on defense. It’s available to them, and if they can press hard enough, it could be a pressure point that would force Denver into a difficult decision:

Would Denver take MPJ out in favor of a stronger defender like Watson or Braun, diluting their offense, or leave him in and stretch the defensive shell to its maximum point to help MPJ?

Going with either Watson or Bruan in favor of MPJ allows Boston to turn the “Porzingis funnel” back on, putting Boston back in its defensive comfort zone.

This is the pressure point that Boston can try to push on when the time comes. No team is perfect, and Boston has cards to play; there’s no doubt about it. 

The question will be whether any of their cards are better than the ones we’ve already seen played against them by the other elite contenders.