Boston: Three Big Things

The Boston Celtics are looking to repeat as NBA Champions, a feat only accomplished by four teams in the 21st century: Los Angeles (2x), Miami, and Golden State. Will they join the exclusive club?

Mar 07, 2025

Will the accumulation of games catch up to this group?
Can Derrick White and Kristaps Porzingis return to their 2023/24 offensive apex?
Can Tatum go left?

Will this team have any Juice left in May/June?

Since the irregular December start of the 2020/21 NBA season, this iteration of Boston’s core has been on a long and consistent run of winning basketball, and winning basketball means games, lots of games.

Since the spring of 2021, the playoff and international games have been stacking up.

Playoff Games since 2021:

Tatum: 68 + Two Olympic Tournaments.
Brown: 63
White: 62 + One Olympic Tournament.
Holiday: 59 + Two Olympic Tournaments.

That volume catches up with you at some point, no matter how good of a team you are. There are only a few teams that have sustained this same level of volume in the NBA over a five-year period:

Miami: 87 playoff games from 2011 → 2014
Golden State: 105 playoff games from 2015 → 2019
Cleveland: 81 playoff games from 2015 → 2018

Cleveland won a title during their stretch, Miami got two, and Golden State captured three titles and five trips to the NBA Finals during their historic “Light Years” Era.

Boston is in the middle of a similar run, and eventually, all of those extra games add up. Especially considering the extra Olympic Tournament in which two of their players have already participated.

Neil Paine

and I discussed this topic on the Low Man Help podcast this week. The volume of games might be nothing. As Neil said, all these guys are relatively young, and you would rather have the workload now than when they’re in their mid-30s. But it’s a significant mental burden to play so much extra high-level basketball, too.

Cleveland feels like the most likely team in the East poised to take advantage of any mental slippage from this Boston team when Playoff basketball rolls around in 2025.

The Compounding Guys:

The 2023/24 Boston team played a beautiful game thanks to White and Porzingis’s capability to serve as connectors, playmakers, and play finishers when needed.

Through their basketball IQ and skill, this trio unlocked Boston’s capability to transform small advantages into large ones on every offensive possession.

During the 2023/24 Playoffs, Derrick White ranked as the second-most efficient player in Spot Up actions (according to Synergy), scoring 1.389 points per possession (PPP). He shot over 40% on an average of 8.5 three-point attempts per game and finished the playoffs with a 4:1 assist-to-turnover ratio.

White is averaging 1.224 points per direct closeout this season, which is in the 84th percentile, a significant figure. However, it is still 16 points lower per 100 possessions than the blistering 1.389 he averaged during the playoffs.

During the 2023/24 season, Boston maximized Porzingis’s size and shooting by utilizing him as a screener in PnR actions. He leveraged his shooting ability to stretch the floor against teams played traditional drop coverages in PnR actions, and when teams switched, Boston showcased Porzingis in the post against smaller defenders.

Last season, Porzingis ranked as the third-most efficient PnR screener in the league, achieving 1.137 points per direct action. He also led the league in points per direct post-ups, with an impressive 1.314. His skill in posting and exploiting switches during PnR actions allowed Boston to create one of the most difficult offenses to defend in recent memory.

Porzingis is still converting post-ups this season at a high rate, 1.217 points per direct. However, his PnR screener numbers have dropped; he’s averaging 1.002 points per direct (50th percentile). This marks a significant decline from last season when he scored about 13 more points per 100 possessions and ranked as the 3rd best PnR screener in the entire league.

When these two are operating at full capacity, this team is nearly unbeatable. Their performance in the final stretch will be a significant factor in Boston’s attempt to repeat.

Tatum As The PnR Initiator:

Jayson Tatum is undoubtedly a great player. Although he has been getting a lot of flack on the internet this season (I'm not sure why), his game is well-rounded, and his resume is extensive.

Playing him at the four-spot has unlocked mismatches that have made Boston a juggernaut to defend.

This season, he’s initiating offense for Boston in PnR actions at the highest rate of his career. He’s executed 1,345 total pick-and-rolls, about 31.2 per 100 possessions. During the last two seasons under Joe Mazzulla, he averaged around 24 PnR’s per 100, and throughout last year's playoffs, he maintained that same figure.

That’s nearly a 33% increase in volume, which is a notable jump. He currently ranks 18th in the NBA in PnR’s run this season. This action is a significant element of his game and, consequently, the Boston offense.

Tatum’s PnR Numbers (Filtered for Top 100 PnR players this season):

Points Per PnR: 1.033 (65th Percentile)

Blitz %: 10.56 (95th Percentile)

Assist Per PnR: 0.112 (9th Percentile)

Turnover Per PnR: 0.080 (39th Percentile)

Data according to Second Spectrum (Prior to 76ers game).

The beauty of PnR basketball is that no defensive coverage can take away everything; every coverage has a solution. But because endless offensive possibilities are available, that doesn’t mean every player can execute them.

Tatum is the type of player who divides opinions; people have strong feelings about him either way. You can examine these PnR numbers and convince yourself that Tatum is a ball-hog who isn’t good at passing, or you can argue that Tatum is so skilled that teams have to blitz him more than nearly anyone else to force the ball out of his hands.

However, like nearly everything related to the Tatum discourse, the truth lies somewhere in between, and it takes matching the data and film together to see where the truth lies.

Dig into the film and one thing starts to really pop out, Tatum doesn’t have nearly the same optionality going left as he does going right.

Tatum’s directional PnR breakdown favors going right; out of the 31 PnR’s per 100 possessions, only 13 of them are going left. This isn’t an outlandish number. After all, he’s a righty, and most right-handed players prefer to get downhill to their strong hand; it allows for stronger finishing opportunities and more decisive passing.

However, the challenge for Tatum when moving left is that, even if he can read the coverage, he lacks the same quality of ball handling, passing or finishing as he does when going right.

Tatum PnRs going RIGHT. Tatum can beat every layer of defense going this direction.

Any Tatum PnR action going right allow him to the ability to beat every layer of the defense with speed and precision via his own scoring options or passes.

Layer 1: Score at the level or getting downhill.
Layer 2: Passes to his screening partner
Layer 3: Passing to the opposite side of the court with his live dribble hand (Right).

In games likely to come down to the final possessions, a few plays can determine the game's outcome. I suspect the smarter team will use a heavy dose of “Weak” (forcing the player toward their weaker hand) PnR coverages to funnel Tatum to his left during the biggest games of the season.

Tatum’s numbers look almost identical going left as well as right. On his 557 PnR’s going left he averages 1.033 PPDirect—truly identical. However, these possessions are against various defenses, and you can’t blindly trust the numbers; you need to combine them with the film to understand the process.

Tatum PnRs going LEFT, and Denver sending Low Man Help from strong side.

Consider these two PnRs from the Denver game, which both resulted in made threes, generating an impressive points per direct of 3.0—excellent numbers. However, the film/process says something notably different. Denver utilized their strong-side player as Low Man Help, rather than their backside player. This choice enabled Tatum to reach Layer 3 of the defense with a shorter pass and, more importantly, without needing to use his left hand to execute it successfully.

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Tatum PnRs going LEFT, and Low Man Help comig from the weak side.

The flaw in the process of going left is Tatum’s inability to make the same passes with his left hand that he can with his right. This tightens every passing angle and reduces the risk of being beaten by skip passes. Defenses can focus more on attempting to neutralize the PnR’s primary option (Tatum) and secondary option (the screener), knowing that their one backside defender can cover two Boston players. It’s a minor detail that can significantly affect spacing.

Are there ways for Boston to scheme their sets to prevent this from being an issue? Yes.

But if you’ve watched Boston this year, you’ve seen Tatum getting into a high volume of PnRs in the middle of the court (most likely from the logo). Tatum is 6th in the league (28.2 feet) in the average distance from the hoop each PnR is set. About 1/3 of his PnR actions have happened in the middle of the floor, with the screeners' average distance from the hoop being 30.4 feet.

This action in this area of the floor is a significant aspect of Boston’s offense, and they are unlikely to abandon it. This action will represent one of the most critical inflection points when Boston faces the other top teams in the league.